Guided by Instinct: Feeling Evolutionary and Political Patterns

Part 3/10 - The Dangerous Confines of Moral Reasoning

Rousseau harnesses the power of nature in the Second Discourse to produce a standard with which all humans can base their political reasoning. He declares that his observations have been, transmitted from “nature [herself], which never lies” and hopes to alert his audience who are, “unhappy with [their] present condition[s]”, to the revelatory transformations which have occurred throughout the evolution of humankind. Rousseau believes that by stripping away all modern amenities, pleasantries, and “artificial faculties”, our true animal nature can be exposed, supplying us with a measure that can help to legitimize present-day human needs and how these needs can be satisfied in contemporary political environments. However, Rousseau’s standard cannot be accepted as an accurate measure for humans to base their political reasoning, as he fails to integrate a disposition common among oppressed and/or marginalized individuals who cannot easily develop a natural understanding of their human rights because their purpose (potential to develop reason) has been impeded. As Rousseau’s narrative unfolds it becomes evident that his measure is merely representative of the majority, who gain a natural consciousness of their individual rights and freedoms (due to their much smoother ascent to reason), failing to acknowledge those who are denied a fair opportunity to become free agents in their lifetime.

Rousseau believes that nature compels every other animal aside from humans, which reveals the greatest distinction between the human species and all other species, that being, “man’s quality of being a free agent” as opposed to other animals who simply “obey” nature’s commands. He states that when humans experience the forces of nature they understand that they are free to comply or to contest, “and it is above all in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of [their] soul reveals itself.” However, Rousseau’s argument is based off a false assumption that all humans can consciously recognize what their natural rights are, delegitimizing the very foundation from which our civil conventions grow. By failing to acknowledge those who are being subconsciously guided by their natural instincts and impulses (acting involuntarily), he is inadvertently dismissing a reactive state of being which is uncommon to the majority who possess the conscious power to choose. Based on this omission alone, we can assume that Rousseau’s standard already falls short in its ability to accurately represent the variety of physical and mental conditions present in civil society, arguably affecting the reliability of any further arguments formed from his reflections about our animal nature.

When comparing all other animal species to humans in the state of nature, Rousseau states that “one chooses or refuses by instinct, and the other by an act of freedom” and finds this characteristic to be very distinctive to our species, as opposed to Aristotle who, in the 4th century, believed that reasoned speech ("logos") alone, was our defining feature. These opinions are highly influential because they constitute the basis from which all our civil laws are derived and the legitimacy of those laws which are meant to protect our private rights as citizens. However, if the political philosophy inspiring these laws was written by someone who possessed a trait that was uncommon to the majority at the time (such as choosing or refusing by act of freedom) then all political structures built off of those assertions could lead to unjust environments for any human who does not possess such a trait, or rather, who is not given a fair opportunity to develop such a trait. In this context, it is now interesting to think about our freedom to choose or refuse as humans and whether it was the physiology of this trait that evolved between the 4th-18th century or if it simply became a more commonly taught, practiced and learned trait among our species which inspired these differing philosophical opinions. If we resolve that the conscious power to choose, is in fact, a learned trait rather than an inherent trait, we can also logically conclude that Aristotle’s convictions about our animal nature were closer to the truth, therefore, a more just standard with which to base our political reasoning.

Connectedly, it is interesting to think about how much the feeling of fear affects the human condition/disposition and how these differing levels may determine whether one will have the opportunity to live in a non-reactive state of being during their lifetime or not and how these unequal levels of fear may determine one’s ability to control their/her/his natural human instincts and capacity to choose freely and consciously. For example, if someone provided unequivocal evidence that Rousseau’s analysis of human nature is most accurate (that humans choose or refuse “by an act of freedom” compared to all other animals who choose or refuse "by instinct") then technically, freedom from fear must also be considered a natural right since it greatly affects the development of this trait that Rousseau claims to be a natural right. In this case, citizens would have to be very mindful about the levels of fear that they may be instilling in others if we are to minimize this form of oppression that could be preventing some citizens from gaining a full consciousness of their capacity to choose freely.

It is also important to critically analyze Rousseau’s faculty of perfectibility and how this

concept obscures the oppressed who do not gain consciousness of their freedom to choose. However, before analyzing this faculty, we need to understand that Rousseau is referring to the perfecting of moral reasoning in his critique as opposed to the perfecting of appearances or other materialistic associations. He describes it as a “distinctive and almost unlimited faculty” that pulls humankind out of their natural condition, suggesting that this trait is common to all. However, those being denied the opportunity to live as free agents, do not get to experience perfectibility in this capacity because they are limited to the freedoms allowed by their oppressors, preventing them from acquiring a level of reasoning that will nurture their inner sense of being, or rather, virtue, which helps one to rationalize morally appropriate behaviour that is harmonious with the majority. One can only hope that Rousseau is attempting to bring awareness to the enormous power of this faculty and how the domination of this faculty is embedded into the very measure for which we determine conventions that shape civil society. From this perspective, the legitimacy of our conventions is severely lessened by this oversight, compelling the reader to want to rectify the creditability of this standard.

Rousseau contrasts the constitution of “civil man” to “natural man”, and how the

very essence of civil man has mutilated nature with its “many forces used, chasms filled in,

mountain flattened, rocks smashed, rivers made navigable, lands opened up, lakes excavated, marshes drained, enormous buildings erected on the earth, the sea covered with ships and sailors” but without enough thought of the true advantages caused by such deformation. Rousseau is distressed by the state of happiness among the human species and the “astonishing disproportion that reigns in these matters” and contemplates the reasoning behind this inequality that guides humans to detest each other “to the extent their interests clash…and in fact, to do to each other all the bad things imaginable”. He makes the ubiquitous argument that one man’s loss is another man’s gain, implying that the benefits produced by the harm done to fellow humans is so great that it drives our species to abandon their moral reasoning to reap such advantages. Among the most shameful forces born from these selfish desires in civil society, is the assault to human freedom, of course, caused by the suppression of moral reasoning, taming the passions of those being denied this natural right. Once the majority is participating in the unjust regulation of this moral reasoning, the fate of humanity rest in hands of the general will, and although it can be “subordinated to other wills that prevail over it” (which disconnects the interest of each human with the common interest) humans are still inclined to desire the general good because not only does their “part of the public evil” seem inconsequential but their/her/his appropriations remain dependent on the satisfaction of the majority. Rousseau asserts that “a great many individuals hope for public disasters”, in my opinion, likely alluding to oppressors who are gaining something valuable by restraining the moral reasoning of those under their control. In this context, a public disaster creates a level of disturbance among society that is high enough to blur the detectability of the those being oppressed in such a manner, allowing the majority to continue benefiting from their exclusive advantages.

Rousseau spends very little time discussing comparative anatomy in the Second

Discourse due to the uncertainty of naturalists at the time which he says is preventing him from building a hearty argument around such knowledge. He states that “On this subject I would be able to form nothing but vague and almost imaginary conjectures” which points to the limitations of this literature in general. Furthermore, since evolutionary biology is the subfield that can help us to better understand the reproductive nature of organisms and new traits born from the mixing of genes, it seems essential that a comprehensive summary of such research is worked into the philosophy that is providing a natural standard which forms the very foundation of our political reasoning to this day.

Although many of Rousseau’s illustrations from 1755 still align with up-to-date knowledge of our prehistoric nature, the usefulness of this discourse is still dependent

on these depictions being updated. Moreover, if these standards are not reflective of the domination of moral reasoning that exists/occurs in civil society, we cannot expect that our conventions (which have been built off these measures) are providing a fair outcome for those who have not gained consciousness of their rights and freedoms. If we can use our most refined information to help further explain root systems existing beneath our current needs and the ever-growing variety of those needs, it will not only reaffirm the legitimacy of these standards but it will also help to re-establish the significance of Rousseau’s Second Discourse in the modern world.

By: Heather Sakaki

Date: Feb 20, 2021