Liberty at its Lowest: Freedom Under the Leviathan

For if we take liberty in the proper sense, for corporeal liberty, that is to say, freedom from chains and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamour as they do for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy.

-Thomas Hobbes Leviathan

In Leviathan, Hobbes claims that God is the causal source of our actions, but also that we act freely because our voluntary actions proceed from liberty (Hobbes 189). According to this theory, subjects can exercise their freedom in a world where everything is predetermined by the laws of nature. Hence, while humans must take responsibility for their actions, they are not necessarily the first cause of these actions. Furthermore, once a person has entered a civil state, that person (now subject) must take authorship of everything their sovereign does because they have authorized all the actions of the commonwealth through such a covenant*. However, this does not result in a reasonable theory for the voluntary actions of animals because humans cannot easily take responsibility for their actions under such precepts, yet must, nevertheless, take full responsibility for them under the law. Before analyzing the contradictory tension within Hobbes’ theory of compatibilism, I will first define “determinism” and “freedom” in general terms and how a “compatibilist*” like Hobbes, views the relationship between these two conditions.

Determinism suggests that “everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of

nature” according to one academic source which states that “part of understanding determinism and especially why it is metaphysically important- is getting clear about the status of the presumed laws of nature” (Hoefer, “Causal Determinism”) since these laws direct human actions under this doctrine. Determinism implies that we are not the upmost causal source of our actions since our actions have their causal beginnings in “the state of the world long ago” (Coates, “Compatibilism”). Hobbes is a determinist insofar as he believes that everything that occurs, including human actions, are the imminent outcome of preceding causes that are a consequence of both the laws of nature and of God (Chappell xi).

Contradictory to this, “freedom”, according to classical compatibilism, is “nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what [they wish] in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in [their] way” (Coates, “Compatibilism”). In Leviathan, Hobbes’ definition of freedom echoes this sentiment and asserts that “freedom signifieth properly the absence of opposition” (188). Under this description, a human is considered free provided they can move freely because Hobbes’ representation of freedom is purely physical. Moreover, since Hobbes believes that moral responsibility overlaps with the laws of nature, causal determinism does not undermine our freedom because we are still morally responsible agents within his theory (Hoafer, “Causal Determinism”). Coates, on the other hand, extends this explanation slightly by adding that “a natural way to think of an agent’s control over [their] conduct…is in terms of [their] ability to select among, or choose between, alternative courses of action” (“Compatibilism”). Under this meaning, acting freely involves alternative potentialities, “when a person acts of [their] own free will” continues Coates, “they could have acted otherwise” because they had a choice in the matter (“Compatibilism”). Since Hobbes denies that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, he would likely reject this definition put forth by Coates.

In Chapter VI of Leviathan, Hobbes discusses the will* at length but does not agree with Coates that a person can act of their own free will because “free will” is an absurd term by his standards. He claims that “when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment…” (188). So, while terms like “free man” remain acceptable under this principle, other concepts such as “free will” and “free speech” are rendered meaningless, since neither will, nor speech can be classified as bodies. This axiom stems from Hobbes’ problematic belief that all living creatures are merely matter in motion. Consequently, by reducing animals down to this confining definition, it means that standards of freedom are proportionately reduced as well, resulting in what we may consider to be some of the lowest standards of liberty in Western history.

For Hobbes, subjects are considered free so long as there is no opposition impeding their motion and says that when it comes to humans “a freeman is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to” (188). This definition, which Hobbes refers to as the “proper” meaning of the word “freeman” is deceptive for three reasons. The first reason is that “strength” and “wit” are immeasurable qualities that range widely among the human species, which makes the definition ambiguous. Ambiguity in this context is harmful because the “freeman” himself is not a reliable judge of his own strength and wit, therefore, the meaning puts arbitrary power into the hands of others who may access these qualities in others to their own advantage. Secondly, it presupposes that the so-called “freeman” possesses a will which contradicts Hobbes’ earlier definition of “will” because he insists that it is an act rather than a faculty. According to his definition, it would be impossible for someone to have a will which, ironically, exposes a meaningless element within the meaning of a supposedly legitimate term. And thirdly, the term “wit” suggests that man possesses intelligence which undermines Hobbes’ initial claim that humans are merely matter in motion. Suddenly, within the “freeman” exists a mind that was not accounted for. Subsequently, a man’s individual freedom requires a higher standard of freedom than the what the term “freedom” itself encompasses within this theory.

Instead, Hobbes believes that will is “the last appetite, or aversion” (74) in deliberation and argues that any creature who has the capacity to deliberate has a will. Within his theory, one does not have a will but rather, they, themselves, will because it is an action as opposed to a faculty (74) in this context. He says that “voluntary motions” are the motions we make in response to our sensory experiences which he says always depend upon a preceding thought (67). This is in contrast with “vital motions”, which operate independently from the mind and account for all the internal motions that keep our bodies running (i.e., circulatory, respiratory, and urinary system etc.). And since "animals [only have] two sorts of motions” (67) according to Hobbes, it means that most visible human actions are voluntary within his theory. As a result, humans never act without first choosing to act since every motion is deliberate in Hobbes’ world. Contradictory to this, he says that every act of man’s will is “in the hand[s] of God” (189) because God is the first cause of everything and states that “[humans] can have no passion nor appetite to anything of which appetite God’s will is not the cause” (190). Confusingly however, there are some actions which “God does not command” (190), therefore, will not take authorship of, but Hobbes does not specify exactly what actions would fall under this category. Evidently, there are some actions that God simply will not take causal responsibility for.

In Chapter XXI of Leviathan, Hobbes connects the term “liberty” with freedom and “necessity” with determinism and insists that liberty and necessity are compatible (189). He uses a metaphor of water flowing through a channel to help illustrate the relationship between freedom and determinism and argues that the water “hath not only liberty but a necessity of descending by the channel” (189). What he means by this, is that if we think of the flowing water as a human and the channel as God’s will, that human would have the liberty to move freely but would ultimately move around the will of God. Hobbes maintains that such movement should be considered “voluntary action” because it proceeds from the will, and thus, proceeds from liberty. In this context, liberty is simply the absence of external impediments and necessity is the result of a cause (189).

Hobbes points to scripture from The Book of Éxodus which depicts the children of Israel showing absolute obedience to Moses to help support his argument for absolute monarchy. In this passage, God (who is speaking through Samuel) says that this level of obedience “shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you” (185) which is the passage that Hobbes feels “confirm[s] the right that sovereigns have” (185). Under this pretense, not only do mutual covenants give unlimited power to sovereign authority, but they also eliminate a subject’s ability to challenge and/or blame the commonwealth because they have transferred all their power in exchange for security. However, it should be clarified that Hobbes is referring to “liberty” in the most limited sense here, that is to say, “liberty from chains and prison” (190) and remarks that once a commonwealth has been instituted “nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice or injury, because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth, so that he [the sovereign] never wanteth right to anything, otherwise than as he himself is the subject of God and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature” (191). Disturbingly, almost nothing the sovereign commands may be considered unjust by those who are being commanded.

The only reason that compatibilism functions within Hobbes’ theory, is because his definition of liberty is so limited. In other words, if it was even slightly more comprehensive, his theory on the voluntary actions of animals would collapse because it would not be able to support such levels of autonomy. Worryingly, for Hobbes, animals do not need to search for their freedom because they already have it according to his theory, that is, if there is nothing impeding their motion. Likewise, by convincing subjects that they are already free, they will be less likely to search for freedom under this assumption, which, coincidentally, works out well for political rulers holding absolute power over their unsuspecting and arguably oppressed subjects.

Sincerely,

Heather

*A covenant is a formal contract that is made according to the laws of nature and is voluntarily entered into by two or more parties

*A “compatibilist” is someone who believes that freedom and determinism are logically compatible

*"Will" is the last appetite in deliberation according to Thomas Hobbes in his book Leviathan

Note: This essay post has been inspired by an insightful academic lecture on Thomas Hobbes' book Leviathan, presented by Dr. Warren Heiti who is a professor of liberal studies and philosophy at VIU. It was also inspired by a somewhat critical seminar discussion with my LBST360 classmates (we dissected a lot of challenging work and controversial subject matter together this semester, I will miss debating with this group!) on Hobbes' social contract theory.

Works Consulted

Hobbes, Thomas, and John Bramhall. Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity. Edited by Vere Chappell, Amherst, Cambridge University Press, 1999, https://assets.cambridge.org, Accessed 10 Apr. 2023.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan Part I & II Revised Edition. Edited by A.P. Martinich and Brian Battiste, Peterborough, Broadview Press, 2011.

Hoefer, Carl. “Causal Determinism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Spring 2023 Edition, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/

determinism-causal/}} Accessed 9 Apr. 2023.

McKenna, Michael, and D. Justin Coates. “Compatibilism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Zalta, Fall 2021 Edition, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/compati bilism/, Accessed 31 Mar. 2023.