Review of Robert Kraynak and Daniel Dennett's Essays on Human Dignity and Bioethics

By Heather Sakaki

Heather is a second year student at Vancouver Island University, Nanaimo, majoring in Liberal Studies. She is predominantly interested in political philosophy and social contract theory, bridging the gap between past and present arguments within these disciplines, and designing original principles and theories that may guide the global political atmosphere in a safer and more inclusive direction.

Although Robert Kraynak and Daniel Dennett deliver coherent and unified arguments to defend their ontological positions in this debate, neither scientific materialism nor

Christian theology can protect human dignity because both doctrines have been inspired by primordialism which not only implies a chaotic and spontaneous account of creation but also conceives humans as immoral and vicious beings who need to be forced into submission. This means that, eventually, both doctrines will always lead to tyranny because they are both guided by the presupposition that justice does not exist by nature, which deliberately threatens the free will. I will be taking the position that human dignity can only be protected if it is regarded as a natural right given that it is an inherent trait; a principle that is best guarded under the model of classical philosophy because it is the only ideology that acknowledges natural law theory.

In his essay on “Human Dignity and the Mystery of the Human Soul”, Kraynak takes a probing look at the ever evolving realm of bioethics and its hidden limitations for the purpose of persuading his audience that the biblical and Christian theological account of nature “make[s] the strongest case for human dignity” (120). Dennett on the other hand, is in opposition to this traditional approach and stubbornly defends his faith in materialism for the purpose of protecting human dignity which he refers to as a “naturalistic defense” in his commentary on Kraynak’s criticisms that were in response to his primary essay.

Kraynak begins his argument by dissecting one of bioethic's governing principles and

wonders why the usefulness of this principle is dependent on an entity (the soul) that lies outside the bounds of science itself. His main concern is that the concept of human dignity cannot be properly understood without a belief in the human soul which at once puts the credibility of his argument into question since beliefs are something that can be manipulated by humans themselves. Kraynak insists that this moral principle is best protected under the Christian theological conception of nature which offers a mysterious account of the soul in relationship to the human experience (120).

He points to the main influencers of scientific materialism, accusing them of benefiting

personally from a soul connection that is being deliberately destroyed in the followers of their doctrine (123). Kraynak is also disturbed by the parallels that can be drawn between scientific materialism and the Hobbesian conception of the universe and why these similarities are cause for concern. He says that Hobbes “denied the essential difference of humans and animals and therefore, rejected any notion of human dignity based on a hierarchy of beings in the universe as a dangerous illusion that led to vainglorious claims of superiority and wars of religion” (121). However, this argument is weakened by Kraynak’s failure to explain exactly why Hobbes’ non-hierarchal perspective automatically suggests a denial of human dignity, especially since Hobbes does, in fact, include an entire chapter on dignity in the Leviathan, defining it as “the public worth of man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth (70). Thus, we see a definition of human dignity that is in direct conflict with the biblical understanding of human dignity, which regards this principle as an inalienable and inherent quality that originates from “God” since “God created man in his own image” (139) according to Genesis. This disharmony helps to explain Kraynak’s confusion regarding Hobbesian theory, and the gross misinterpretations that can arise when two opposing, indoctrinated mindsets collide.

Krayak is particularly skeptical of Dennett’s influence and the contradictions he finds within the logic of his belief system and is particularly offended by his omittance of the

rational soul and the failure of this acknowledgement. Kraynak finds that Dennett’s notions of

dignity “implicitly embraces a dualism of substances ‘mind vs. matter or nature vs. freedom’”

(123) that is incompatible with the tenets of materialism which make “morality impossible” and argues that this contradiction results in an overinflated conception of human dignity which is even more problematic (123). Interestingly, the strongest points that Kraynak presents in this essay can be found within his argument against classical philosophy as a basis for human dignity in which human beings are viewed as rational souls connected to a physical body. Kraynak explains how dignity is legitimized by the unique human potential to develop reason within this ideology and traces the foundations of this theory back to Aristotle’s De Anima and his hierarchy of souls which Kraynak says “elevat[es] man to the top of the natural hierarchy but not quite equal to the highest substance in the universe” (123). His main concern, is that classical Greek philosophy recognizes human beings as lesser than the divine intelligence that directs the universe, making human dignity a “comparative” principle that is vulnerable to demotion (Kraynak 124). Kraynak proceeds to strengthen his argument by giving us the Christian perspective, which regards humans as a “living reflection of the divine intelligence that orders the cosmos” (124) which he claims, gives human dignity the “absolute” status that bioethics seems to require. And while I do agree that this perspective has the potential to protect the mind, body, and soul of those who inherit this perspective at a young age due to the goodness they are empowered to embody, because the “human soul” itself is a concept that can be easily manipulated, it cannot be expected

to uphold human dignity in the way that bioethics demands. For this reason, a belief in the

human soul cannot be considered a just concept for which to explain our “special moral status” as humans because it is not possible to understand this concept before developing the ability to think abstract thoughts. And since our capacity to think abstract thoughts can be manipulated before we may develop reason, we need to regard human dignity as an inherent quality that exists in us by nature so that it becomes a natural and inalienable right grounded in natural law.

Lastly, Kraynak presents us with a weak argument in favour of the biblical and Christian

model which he finds to be the most anchoring view of humankind because it “grounds human dignity in God’s ‘mysterious election’ rather than in essential attributes” (126) supposedly. He claims that a source of divinity can “[extend] the concept of the soul beyond rational consciousness” (126) and that human dignity is best protected by those who experience the world from this vantage point because all individuals who share this perspective feel a unity with each other due to the goodness they embody which has been given to them by their god, according to Kraynak (126). Under this ideal, followers see themselves as an image of their god with a predetermined destiny while maintaining a level of mysteriousness about the universe which helps to temper any questions that science and reason cannot answer (128). And while this argument may appeal to Kraynak’s Christian audience, he cannot expect this defence to go over well with the secular community who will likely find it difficult to see the goodness in his assertions here, due to their conflicting perspective of nature and may even feel contempt for his desire to maintain a mysterious conception of the soul. Yet Kraynak insists that this threefold model offers us “the whole truth about man” (129) because it acknowledges a source of divinity in addition to explanations about the body and soul, failing to remind his audience that classical philosophy also acknowledges all three of these elements without the need for an all-powerful god(s).

Kraynak’s argument is unsuccessful in persuading his opponent, Dennett, who believes

that it would be a very grave error to fall back on the Christian model at this point in history

because it “will only foster incredulity and cynicism in those we need to persuade” (131). We

can assume he is referring to modern skeptics here, who would likely have trouble seeing the

value in the “traditional defense”, since open-ended mysteries are unlikely to satisfy the

curiosity of this group. From Dennett’s perspective, the Biblical hierarchy of souls is far too

outdated to be of use in the case of human dignity, reminding Kraynak that many of the

materialists he seeks to reason with, do not consider humans superior to other species by any means (132).

Dennett does a good job of maintaining his modern scientific position relating to the

values of human dignity in his commentary and can see the danger in Kraynak’s illusive analysis of the human soul and his desire to preserve a mysterious account of it. He says that “the soul is not going to stay mysterious, and it’s a good thing it isn’t, since as we come to understand how it works, we will be able to explain why and how human minds are morally competent in a way that animal minds are not” (132). And while I cannot share in Dennett’s view about the “incompetency” of the animal mind, I do appreciate his understanding for the need of conclusive scientific analysis of the human soul and why such evidence would be helpful with respect to human dignity and the safeguarding of this moral principle.

Upon closer reflection, we can see how both arguments can be traced back to the

primordialist view of nature in which “the ‘first’ things are generated out of random motions”

(Newell 95). According to Waller Newell, this ontology causes “chance motions and unstructured energies of phusis [to] well up in us as the drive to maintain our lives and gratify

our passions” (95). Hence, we see an eerie similarity between ancient primordalism and modern scientific materialism which compels us to observe positive law and convention with skepticism because it “forbid[s] us to gratify these desires” (Newell 95). Furthermore, because these laws vary from region to region and change alongside history, they are seen as “rootless constructions imposed against nature” (Newell 95) from the perspective of a materialist, which ultimately leads to historicist attitudes that leave human dignity defenseless against biotechnology and life sciences. Consequently, human-made laws become as changeable and as groundless as nature itself within this context, ultimately leading to moral relativism which is a view that cannot protect even the most basic moral and ethical principles never mind something as essential as human dignity.

I will now apply Aristotle’s theory of causation to this debate for the purpose of

defending my thesis which argues for the validation of natural law grounded in the model of

classical philosophy, and more specifically, why human dignity can be conceived as an

inalienable human right within this framework. In Book II of Physics, Aristotle thoughtfully

outlines the state of nature, for the purpose of grounding human rights in natural law. His first account of nature explains the things that exist ‘by nature’ which refers to all things that have “within [themselves] a of principle motion and of stationariness” (Aristotle 75). Next, he

explains the things that exist “according to nature’ which are things which indicate that “nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute” (Aristotle 75). Once he has made this distinction, he proceeds to outline four principles of causation that work to authenticate his thesis which I will list in the order by which they were originally presented in Physics, written in 350 BCE.

1. Material cause - The matter out of which a thing is made of.

2. Formal cause – The essence or arrangement of a thing.

3. Efficient cause – The source of the change or coming to rest.

4. Final cause – The purpose for a things’ existence.

From here, we may better observe our evolution as living organisms and see, first, how

scientific materialism helps to explain material causation because it focuses on the composition and matter of the human body. Secondly, we can see how both scientific materialism and classical philosophy help to explain formal causation because they explore the most important questions about our existence through the pursuit of knowledge which allows for the human mind to grow to its full potential (to achieve reason and reasoned speech) which are the very traits that make us unique from other animals. And thirdly, we can see how both classical philosophy and Christian theology help to explain efficient causation because they acknowledge universal principles which help to explain first causes, or rather, the unexplainable force that caused the beginning of the universe which connects us to a source of divinity or soul. Not only does this mean that we have a much more complete and purposeful understanding of the human body, mind, and soul than the ancients may have had, but it also means that we have a greater capacity to make decisions that will be beneficial to our species as one whole collectively.

If we now connect this natural law theory to Waller Newell’s essay on “Ontology of

Primordialism and the Platonic Critique of Sophists” we can begin to examine questions about our final cause as humans because the ancient primordialist view of nature is analogous with modern scientific materialism. This interrelation suggests that we have made one full evolution in our thinking patterns which mean that we can more easily hypothesize about our final cause because we have arguably reached the end of our evolution as a

species (meaning that humans are unlikely to evolve into anything other than what they are now) since we have come full circle in our patterns of reasoning. This gives us the freedom to now speculate about our final cause and affirm that our purpose as living organisms, is to achieve reason. We can also reaffirm our formal cause as a species and ground our very essence (soul) in the model of classical philosophy where it will remain protected for all eternity under natural law. Moreover, if modern scientific theory is successful in proving the existence of the soul, we could officially declare human dignity a natural right that is inherent to our species because our potential to develop reason is directly dependent on our soul health (“form” or “formal cause”) within this ideology.

If Kraynak and Dennett had taken the trouble to trace their arguments back to the pre-

Socratics and their primordalist view of nature, they would have been able to notice an

evolutionary pattern in relation to their desired doctrines which designedly work against human dignity in both cases and why classical philosophy (which rests in the middle of Christian theology and scientific materialism (that is, if we look at our chronology from the perspective of one whole cycle as opposed to individual parts) is the most moderate, therefore, the most rational approach for which to undertake an issue as important as bioethics. In other words, we need not repeat history simply because we have reached the end of it, but rather, we may now choose the best approach to ground our dignity for the purpose of protecting future generations because we can finally reflect on one complete cyclical evolution of reasoning. That is, if there are any free thinkers left to make this choice.